经济责任审计、政府行为与实体经济高质量发展

As an important basic institution in the national governance system, Economic Responsibility Audit is an important guarantee for the high-quality development of economy in China. The high-quality development of the real economy is the foundation of high-quality economic development. However, there is little research on the role of Economic Responsibility Audit in the high-quality development of the real economy, including the theoretical analysis and empirical research..This project holds that government officials are the key factor through which Economic Responsibility Audit affects the quality of the real economy. This project promotes the basic theory of Economic Responsibility Audit from a dynamic perspective, and proposed two paths that the economic responsibility audit affects the high-quality development of the real economy through changing government behavior and provide empirical evidence correspondingly: First, by decreasing the information asymmetry between the lower and upper levels of government, Economic Responsibility Audit can lower the moral hazard of government officials and adverse selection in officials promotion, optimizing the business environment of enterprises, stimulating enterprises to adopt high-quality development means; Second, by changing the incentive structure of governmental officials, Economic Responsibility Audit influence government behavior and guiding the direction of government-enterprise cooperation, and then encourage enterprises to adopt a development means that is more in line with central government policy..Economic Responsibility Audit is a unique auditing institution in China. The theoretical and empirical analysis in the project will greatly enrich the existing basic theories of state auditing, and provide empirical evidence of Chinese characteristics for the world about the important role of state audit in high quality development of economy.

经济责任审计作为国家治理体系中重要的基础性制度安排，是我国经济高质量发展的重要保障。实体经济高质量发展是实现经济高质量发展的根基，但目前鲜有研究对经济责任审计在实体经济高质量发展中的作用进行系统理论分析和实证检验。.本项目认为政府官员是经济责任审计影响实体经济发展质量的着力点。本项目从动态视角完善了现有经济责任审计基本理论，并提出经济责任审计通过政府行为影响实体经济高质量发展的两条作用路径并选取具体场景进行了实证检验：一是通过缓解上下级政府信息不对称，抑制政府官员道德风险和官员选聘逆向选择，优化企业营商环境，促使企业倾向于采用高质量的发展手段；二是通过改变官员的激励结构影响政府行为，引导政企合作方向，促使企业采取更符合中央政策规定的发展方式。.经济责任审计是中国特有的审计制度，这一理论和实证研究会极大地丰富现有国家审计基本理论，同时为国际上国家审计服务经济高质量发展提供中国特色的经验证据。

国家审计将作为一种常态性的监督机制，在国家治理中扮演着越来越重要的角色。在审计全覆盖和高压反腐的背景下，领导干部的经济责任审计作为全面覆盖所有党政领导干部的常态化的审计类型，以地方政府官员为着力点成为影响实体经济发展质量的关键因素。中国经济已由高速增长阶段转向高质量发展阶段，二十大报告再次强调了绿色发展的重要性。本项目以经济责任审计和领导干部自然资源资产离任审计为官员行为研究的切入点，探讨官员激励是否能在经济高质量发展中继续发挥引擎作用以及如何更好地发挥作用。.本项目研究认为国家审计主要作用于经济资源配置效率和政府行政质量进而推动经济高质量发展。相较于审计单位覆盖率和审计内容覆盖率，经济责任审计覆盖率对国有企业治理效率有着显著的正向影响，且这一影响在国家审计机关信息透明度较高的地区更显著。除了直接纠偏外，国家审计覆盖率主要通过影响地方政府行为和政企关系而影响国有企业治理效率，具体作用机制表现为：一是国家审计覆盖率通过缓解政府和企业之间的信息不对称降低了地方国有企业代理成本，进而提高了国有企业治理效率；二是国家审计覆盖率通过强化权力监控降低了政府不当干预带来的国有企业效率损失。.领导干部自然资源资产离任审计是经济责任审计在我国经济高质量发展阶段衍生的新审计类型，这一新型国家审计实践的开展显著增加了环保在政府官员激励结构中的权重，硬化了地方政府官员生态环保约束，为研究经济责任审计通过影响官员行为进而影响实体经济高质量发展提供了较好的研究场景。本项目研究发现，领导干部自然资源资产离任审计的开展冲击了原有政企关系，具体表现为降低了高污染企业的政府补助，促进了高污染企业绿色创新。本项目为政府官员激励结构动态变化在实体经济高质量发展中的作用提供了新的理论解释，提供了微观层面的经验证据。