基于博弈论视角的我国食品行业监管模型与机制创新研究

How to ensure food safety has attracted extensive attention from all walks of life. The supervisory mechanism that have been applied in current food industry often consider single approach by only one major regulatory agency (i.e., the government), which often is not effective and ignore the behavior and heterogeneity of relevant parties in food industry. To deal with the above issues, this project intends to conduct a thorough research to provide theoretical basis and policy suggestions for the government to establish scientific, effective and reasonable regulation mechanisms in food industry. The first contribution is to build multi-agent combinatorial regulatory mechanisms involving the government, food companies and the public, which can help the government to establish effective regulatory measures. The second contribution is to construct dynamic game models and group game models of food industry regulation based on cutting-edge game theories including zero-determinant strategy and mean field strategy, aiming to analyze players' strategy selection and interaction effect in the regulation and provide a basis for formulating sound regulatory strategies. Then, considering the psychology and behavior of related parties in food industry regulation, we explore the regulation models and strategies with incomplete rational players, which can help the government establish more practical regulatory strategies. The final contribution is to investigate how the government should formulate regulatory strategies when facing food companies in different development stages from the perspective of enterprise life cycle, aiming to propose a hierarchical supervision mechanism.

如何保障“舌尖上的安全”已成为社会各界共同关注的焦点。针对食品行业监管中监管主体和监管手段单一、监管效率低下、忽略主体行为与异质性等问题，本项目拟从博弈论视角，对我国食品行业监管问题进行深入研究，为政府建立科学、高效、合理的监管机制提供理论依据与政策建议。具体来说，构建由政府、企业与社会共同参与的多主体组合监管机制，为政府采用多元的监管手段提供理论参考；基于博弈理论与方法，构建食品行业监管的动态博弈模型和群体博弈模型，分别运用零行列式策略与平均场策略，分析监管过程中各主体的策略选择与相互影响，为政府制定高效的监管策略提供方法与模型；考虑相关主体心理与行为，研究食品行业各主体在不完全理性下的监管模型，为政府制定更加符合实际的监管策略提供前沿思考；进一步从企业生命周期的视角，研究政府面对处于不同生命周期发展阶段食品企业时的监管策略，为政府制定分层监管模式提供决策依据。

如何保障“舌尖上的安全”是社会各界共同关注的焦点。尽管我国已形成了以“最严谨的标准、最严格的监管、最严厉的处罚、最严肃的问责”为核心的最严食品安全监管制度，但是监管有效性不足仍是造成食品安全问题频发的重要原因。基于此，本项目针对食品行业监管中存在的监管主体和监管手段单一、监管效率低下、忽略主体行为与异质性等问题，对我国食品行业监管问题进行了深入研究，为建立科学、高效、合理的食品安全治理体系提供了理论依据与政策建议。主要研究：首先，研究了影响食品安全的关键因素以及政府提高食品监管效率的重要举措，发现检查频率、自律成本与不自律处罚是影响企业生产行为的重要因素，因此政府可通过加大检查概率、减低企业自律成本、提高处罚等措施缓解食品安全问题。其次，研究了媒体等多元主体参与下政府监管博弈问题，发现媒体参与监管对提高政府监管效率、改善中央与地方代理关系起到积极的作用，但不实报道的存在会加大政府监管的难度。然后，研究了食品行业各主体在不完全理性下的监管模型，发现消费者质量偏好会倒逼农户进行生态种植，上级政府应加大对地方政府农产品质量监管工作的检查频率，地方政府应加大对于生态种植的补贴和对农药残留超标行为的罚款。最后，基于生命周期理论探讨了针对食品和食品企业的安全监管问题，针对瞬时与非瞬时变质特征的食品供应链优化问题进行了研究，并提出了政府主导、企业自律、协会自治、学术界权威发声、媒体监督、消费者参与的“六位一体”的食品安全社会共治体系。研究结论有利于丰富与促进了行为理论、博弈理论与运筹优化等理论和方法在监管领域的运用，对提升消费者对我国食品安全的信心，加强我国食品安全治理，促进食品行业健康、长远发展具有重要的现实意义。