审计事务所交互作用机制研究——基于企业集团非统一审计视角

Utilizing the Chinese setting of business group non-uniform audits, this project investigates interaction mechanisms among different audit firms. Specifically, we investigate determinants and economic consequences associated with business groups' decision to hire multiple external auditors, formations and impacts of various interaction mechanisms, such as bonding, collusion, competition, collaboration, and free riding, and relations between corporate governance of business groups and non-uniform audits/associated interaction mechanisms. In so doing, we explore the new strand of research on interaction mechanisms among multiple audit firms, and contribute to the emerging literature on non-uniform audits within business groups. With a rapid expansion in recent years, business groups have become increasingly indispensable to the China’s economy. This project helps us detect and remedy deficiencies relating to current monitoring schemes over business groups and guide us to improve business group-related auditing standards. Meanwhile, the prevalence of non-uniform audits in business group seems to contradict the uniform audit advocated by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council and the Ministry of Finance of the People’s Republic of China. By examining the economic consequences of business group non-uniform audits, this project sheds new light on whether China should hasten the process of assigning the same audit firm for a business group. Furthermore, the European Commission and the European Parliament recently (in year 2011) encouraged firms to adopt joint audit scheme, that is, to employ two external audit firms in a single audit. Although this scheme is considerably different from business group non-uniform audits as in our project, yet they both involve dynamic interactions between (among) audit firms. Our project thus provides useful insights on whether China, with its current level of regulatory and institutional development, should carry on joint audit in the near future.

本课题藉由我国企业集团聘请多家审计事务所情景打开事务所交互作用的“黑匣子”，通过研究企业集团非统一审计抉择及经济后果，事务所交互作用机制(绑定、合谋、竞争、协作、搭便车等)成因及影响，集团内部治理与非统一审计及事务所交互机制关系，开拓审计事务所交互机制这一新兴研究领域，并弥补现有文献关于企业集团非统一审计缺陷。企业集团对我国国民经济举重若轻，近年来其迅猛发展态势使集团监管中存在问题日益突出，本课题的开展将丰富和拓展转轨经济国家企业集团治理及监督理论，并完善集团审计相关准则。与此同时，资本市场普遍存在的集团非统一审计与国资委和财政部统一审计政策方针背道而驰，课题针对此现象为我国企业集团审计方式提供决策依据。进一步，欧盟委员会和欧洲议会2011年宣布鼓励联合审计(两家事务所审计同一上市公司),本课题结合我国现阶段制度环境为是否引入联合审计提供前瞻性政策指引。

课题背景和研究意义：传统审计研究文献多以单个审计事务所(e.g., 蔡春和鲜文铎，2007；吴联生和刘慧龙，2008；雷光勇等，2009；DeFond et al., 2000；Chan et al., 2006) 或事务所中具体审计成员 (e.g., Chen et al., 2010； 刘明辉，2012) 为研究对象，而对不同审计事务所交互机制鲜有涉及。本课题利用企业集团聘请多家审计事务所进行审计(简称“企业集团非统一审计” )的情境，打开事务所交互作用的“黑匣子”。基于课题的研究背景及现实需求，我们认为其具有极为重要的理论、实践与政策指导意义。其中理论意义 具体包括1）弥补审计事务所间交互作用机制的研究缺陷； 2）有助于全面了解企业集团选择非统一审计动机及其经济后果； 3）丰富和拓展了转轨经济国家企业集团治理及监督理论。实践和政策意义具体包括：1）为政府加快企业集团统一审计进程提供实证经验支撑； 2）为保障经济转型期企业集团的监督机制提供决策参考； 3）为完善集团审计相关准则提供理论依据； 4）为是否引进“联合审计”制度提供前瞻性政策指引。.课题主要研究内容：本课题依托企业集团非统一审计情景对不同外部审计事务所在审计集团关联业务中的交互作用机制进行探讨，同时对企业集团非统一审计抉择及其经济影响以及企业集团内部公司治理与外部非统一审计关系进行深入探究。基于以上研究内容，我们将课题研究内容具体分为以下四点：1）企业集团非统一审计抉择的影响因素及其经济后果；2）不同审计事务所交互作用机制； 3）不同交互作用机制的影响因素及其经济后果； 4）企业集团内部治理结构与非统一审计，及非统一审计下交互作用机制间的关系。.课题研究取得了一系列重要成果：课题负责人在Journal of Business Ethics (Financial Times 45)的英文SSCI期刊发表了两篇文章，在Abacus英文SSCI刊物发表一篇文章，同时在Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 英文SSCI刊物发表1篇文章，课题组成员在Management Accounting Research 英文SSCI期刊发表一篇文章，共计五篇高水平国际发表。课题成果同时参加多次会议。课题所依托的关键数据包括集团企业以及其子公司的财务和审计等信息。