民营上市公司外聘高管的代理成本与激励机制效果：基于经理人市场视角

At present the demand of recruiting managers from managerial labor market for private listed companies in order to improve enterprise management level is increasing. The difference of top managers' employment will lead to different economic effects. A lot of literatures have researched the effects of top manager's individual character, such as education experience or political connection, on top managers' agency costs and enterprise performance. Differing from past literatures, the purpose of this project is to analyze systemly from theoretics and evidences the relationship between top managers outside/inside employment and agency costs, the effects of pay incentive mechanism, and enterprise performance based on the perspective of managerial labor market. Concretely we pay more attention to the issues as following: (1) Which type private listed company are more willing to recruit top managers from external managerial labor market than internal promotion? (2) Can external recruitment managers improve more in enterprise resourse allocation efficiency than internal promotion managers? (3)Whether does external recruitment managers bring enterprise higher agency costs than internal promotion managers? (4) Whether the sensitivity of the relationship between top managers' pay and entreprise performance for external recruitment managers is stronger than that for internal promotion managers? Can the incentive mechanism for external recruitment managers improve more in resourse allocation efficiency and reduce more agency costs? (5)Can external recruitment managers improve enterprise performance and shareholder interests? In the process of research, we always take the impact of managerial labor market on the five issues above into account. Theoretically, we expect this research not only can rich the literetures of agency costs, but also help to understand that the condition of incentive mechanism function well and how market mechanism affect enterprise financial behavour. In practice, this research can provide some advics on promoting innovation both for private enterprises and state-owned enterprises.

目前民营上市公司外聘高管以提升企业管理水平的需求十分迫切。企业高管选任方式不同会产生不同经济效果。即有研究大多讨论高管学历或政治关联等个人特征对高管代理成本与企业业绩的影响。本课题则基于经理人市场这一独特视角，从理论与经验上系统分析民营上市公司高管是外部招聘还是内部提拔对代理成本和激励机制效果的影响，进而对企业业绩的影响。具体而言，主要研究以下问题：民营上市公司在什么情况下从市场招聘高管而不是内部提拔；外聘高管能否凭借其管理才能提升企业资源配置效率；外聘高管是否会导致较高的代理成本；外聘高管激励机制的强度是否更高，此激励机制能否提升企业资源配置效率和降低代理成本；外聘高管能否提升企业业绩和股东利益。我们同时考虑经理人市场发育对上述问题的影响。本课题理论上可丰富代理成本的研究，加深对激励机制实施条件和市场机制如何影响企业财务行为的理解。实践上可为推进我国民营企业甚至国有企业改革提供相关建议。

本项目基于经理市场视角，系统分析民营上市公司外聘高管的动因、外聘高管对资源配置效率、代理成本和高管激励机制进而对公司业绩的影响。主要结论有：（1）经营风险较高的公司更愿意聘用外部高管；内部管理才能供给较丰富时，聘用外部高管愿意较低；外部管理才能供给较丰富时会聘用较多外部高管或外部CEO，但外部董事并无显著增加；经理市场发育欠佳的地区，经营风险、内部管理才能供给对外部高管规模的影响更显著。研究还发现：管理才能专用性越强，公司更愿意内部提拔高管；经理市场发育良好地区，管理才能专用性对外聘高管规模的影响较弱。（2）外部董事比例越高，企业投资反应系数越大，资本配置效率越高。外部董事提升资本配置效率的作用源于外部董事可拓展投资机会并扩大投资规模。在发育欠佳的经理市场中，外部董事拓展企业投资机会与投资规模、提升资本配置效率的作用更佳。研究还发现，外部高管采用了减少冗余雇员并提高在职员工报酬的雇用政策，根据外部劳动力市场供给对员工雇用政策进行灵活调整，从而改善了员工配置效率。（3）外部董事比例越高，绝对代理成本越高，但相对代理成本并不高；外部董事比例越高，公司越倾向于选择大规模审计师，支付的绝对审计费用较高，但相对审计费用并不高；经理市场较发达时，外部董事引致的代理成本相对较低，公司更倾向于选择大规模审计师，支付的审计费用较低。（4）外部董事比例越高，高管薪酬越高，薪酬业绩敏感度下降，且董事薪酬业绩敏感度下降幅度高于经理层，高管薪酬粘性越弱，且经理薪酬粘性下降幅度大于董事；发育较好的经理市场可促使外部董事提高经理薪酬业绩敏感度，降低经理薪酬粘性，但促使外部董事提高董事薪酬业绩敏感度及降低董事薪酬粘性的作用有限。结果表明外部董事提升高管薪酬激励机制有效性的作用有限，发达的经理市场可促使外部董事改善经理薪酬激励效果。（5）外部高管或外部董事可提高公司股市业绩，但不能改善经营业绩；外部CEO不能提高公司股市业绩，但可改善经营业绩；经理市场较发达时，外部高管或外部董事才可提升公司股市业绩，外部CEO才可改善经营业绩。结果表明，唯有聘请具有丰富企业管理经验的外部高管才可提升民营上市公司管理水平，发育良好的经理市场可促使外部高管提升企业业绩。本项目丰富了外部高管聘用动机和影响公司业绩机制的相关成果，揭示了经理市场的作用机制，可为企业聘用外部高管和劳动力市场主管部门制订政策提供决策依据。