企业交叉持股的长期竞争效应研究：基于反垄断的视角

The passive cross-holdings in oligopoly can work as a strategic instrument to facilitate long-term tacit collusion and the related industrial performance. As a result, such horizontal and vertical passive cross ownerships in related firms have prevailed in many industries in USA, Europe, and Japan. In the last decade, both horizontal and vertical passive cross ownerships have become gradually popular among companies in China, especially in the listed corporations. However, the clauses of the Anti-Trust Law of the People’s Republic of China don’t involve the case of cross-holdings in firms. Therefore, from the anti-trust perspective, this project will focus on investigating the (anti)competitive effects of cross-holdings in infinitely repeated oligopolies, and try to provide some specific policy implications of cross-holdings for Chinese anti-trust authority. Firstly, we explore the long-run (anti)competitive effects of horizontal passive cross ownerships in rival firms through applying the theories of network game, corporate finance, and oligopoly. Secondly, we adopt the theories of social network and vertical constraints to discuss the (anti)competitive effects of passive vertical integration on either upstream or downstream firms from the long-term perspective. And subsequently, we carry on the empirical study on the long-term (anti)competitive effects of cross-holdings in oligopoly to test our main conclusions via using the panel data of Chinese listed corporations. As a result, we provide the Chinese anti-trust authority with the conditions under which cross-holdings will facilitate or hinder tacit collusion between firms in the long-term so as to complement the Anti-Trust Law to some extent. Especially, our policy implications will be helpful to improve the clauses of the Anti-Trust Law in two parts: Monopoly Agreements, and Concentrations of Undertakings.

关联性交叉持股往往作为一种企业间达成默契合谋的策略影响企业的长期竞争行为与相关产业绩效，这也是欧美、日本等经济发达国家的企业间存在比较普遍的横向与纵向交叉持股的重要原因。近十年来，我国企业，尤其是上市公司的关联性横向与纵向交叉持股日益普遍，而我国的反垄断法却对非控股的企业交叉持股情形没有做出任何限定。因而，本项目基于反垄断的视角，探讨交叉持股对企业长期竞争行为的影响，尝试为我国的反垄断部门提供相关的政策参考。首先，运用网络博弈、公司金融与寡头竞争等理论研究企业横向交叉持股的长期竞争效应。其次，结合社会网络理论、纵向约束理论探究企业纵向交叉持股对产业链上下游企业的长期竞争效应。然后，通过我国上市公司交叉持股数据对主要结论进行经验检验。最后，基于研究结果为我国反垄断部门提供识别交叉持股促进和阻碍企业竞争的条件，从而为完善我国反垄断法中关于垄断协议和经营者集中两个部分的法律条款提供参考依据。

欧美、日本等国家企业间的关联性交叉持股往往作为一种达成合谋的策略而对产业的竞争和绩效产生负面影响。自从2006年以来，我国上市公司的横向与纵向交叉持股日益普遍，而全球的反垄断法却对企业的交叉持股行为基本没有做出有效的限定。因而，本项目从理论与经验上探讨了横向与纵向交叉持股对企业长期竞争行为的影响，进而尝试为我国的反垄断部门提供反垄断政策参考。. 首先，从理论上探究了横向交叉持股及其结构对企业合谋的影响。研究发现，当企业的产品存在横向差异化时，横向交叉持股导致的反竞争效应取决于持股比例的大小与产品间的替代性强弱。总体而言，当交叉持股比例很小或很大时，增加持股比例会促进企业间的合谋。同时，在单边星型持股结构下，产品间的替代性越强，企业间的合谋越难达成。相对而言，在企业的成本不对称时，横向持股的竞争效应主要取决于持股企业的大小和持股结构。当小企业持股大企业时，可能存在反竞争效应。进一步，对称持股结构会促进企业间的合谋，而单边星型持股结构仅在持股企业的大小符合条件时才会产生反竞争效应。. 其次，从理论上探索了纵向交叉持股的企业长期竞争效应。研究发现，后向持股几乎在任何的后向持股结构下都会促进上游企业的合谋，而前向持股却会阻碍该合谋，只要下游企业在竞争中能够获得正的利润。而后向持股往往不会对下游企业的长期竞争产生消极影响，但前向持股却在持股比例较大时促进下游企业的合谋，特别是在星形结构下这种反竞争效应更加显著。. 第三，使用2006-2018年我国上市公司的数据对横向和纵向交叉持股的主要结论进行了计量检验。经验研究选取了我国有代表性的若干产业进行了计量分析。结果表明，横向交叉持股具有比较明显的反竞争效应，而后向持股会提升上游产业中企业的市场势力，前向持股却往往会促进上游和下游企业的竞争。最后，基于研究结论为我国反垄断部门提供识别交叉持股促进企业合谋的条件，从而为完善我国反垄断法的法律条款提供理论与经验参考。