政府投资工程项目招投标纵向合谋行为及治理机制研究

The vertical collusion of the stakeholders such as the agent of owner, the bidding agency, the supervision institution, the tenderer, and so on becomes as common as the horizontal collusion in the government investment construction project bidding, which is the more adverse effect behavior against the regulations and laws. Firstly,the vertical collusive bidding behavior and its governance mechanism in the government investment construction project are focused on this research , and the analytical paradigm, mapping relation and control target of the vertical collusion behavior will be constructed by employing evidence reasoning, hierarchical regression and calculation test methods. Secondly, from the perspective of cost, risk and benefit, the initial and dynamic equilibrium conditions of the "cost-risk-benefit" triangle will be analyzed under the different condition of vertical collusion, and the depth learning, rigid failure and tracking and locking mechanism of the vertical collusion detection system will be established, and the "three institutions - three supervisions" framework of governance mechanism of the vertical collusion behavior will be constructed. Lastly, the systems will be designed scientifically such as the feasibility commitment cracking, the credibility deterrence , the paying cost overflow to govern the vertical collusion. The results of this research have theoretical and practical significance,which will guide the government departments to come up the specific and applicable and instructional governance schemes of the vertical collusion behavior, improve the management methods of construction project bidding , regulate the function and roles and responsibilities of the owners and its representatives, the bidding agency, the supervision institution and other stakeholders.

政府投资工程项目招投标中业主代表、招标机构代理人、监督机构代理人、投标方等利益主体的纵向合谋与横向合谋现象一样比较普遍，是不良影响更为显著的违规违法行为。本研究聚焦于政府投资工程项目招投标纵向合谋行为及治理机制，综合运用证据推理、分层回归、计算试验等方法，系统构建纵向合谋行为的分析范式、映射关系与管控目标，从成本、风险、收益综合视角解析不同纵向合谋形式条件下的“成本-风险-收益”三角形初始与动态均衡条件，建立纵向合谋行为侦测系统的深度学习、刚性失效和跟踪锁定机制，构建招投标纵向合谋行为治理的“三制-三监督”框架，科学设计纵向合谋行为治理的可行性承诺破解、可信性威慑强化、可支付成本溢出制度。研究成果对于指导政府部门出台具有针对性、适用性和指导性的工程招投标纵向合谋行为治理方案，完善工程招投标管理办法，规范业主及其代表、招标代理机构、监管部门等利益主体的功能、职责和角色具有理论价值和现实意义。

本课题围绕政府投资工程项目纵向合谋行为分析及治理机制展开理论分析与实证研究，揭示政府投资工程项目纵向合谋行为基本内涵，构建政府投资工程项目纵向合谋行为分析范式，采用探索性因子分析等方法识别政府投资工程项目纵向合谋行为的成因，运用博弈模型分析政府投资工程项目纵向合谋行为均衡条件，并通过数值模拟仿真分析其稳定性，建立用户画像和深度神经网络模型进行政府投资工程项目纵向合谋行为监测，基于证据推理和支持向量机测算政府投资工程项目纵向合谋行为倾向度，设计纵向合谋行为侦测系统，建立政府投资工程项目纵向合谋行为治理机制。研究成果为政府招投标监督部门提供具有针对性、适用性和指导性的工程招投标纵向合谋行为治理方案，对招标人、招标代理机构、监管部门、投标人等利益主体行为的规范与监管具有理论价值和现实意义。