管理层业绩预告及其对盈余质量和审计师谨慎性的影响

Management earnings forecasts are the estimation and preannouncement of forthcoming earnings made by company management shortly before the disclosure of periodic financial reports. Except for a small proportion of voluntary earnings forecasts, all other management earnings forecasts in China belong to mandatorily required disclosure, such as forecasted loss, forecasted change from loss to profit, large proportion of increase/decrease in profit. This research project specifically analyzes and evaluates management earnings forecasts related disclosure strategies and disclosure quality in Chinese listed companies. After that, the effects of shareholders, board and management on different types of management earnings forecasts are considered from a perspective of corporate governance. Then, the effects of management earnings forecasts on the value relevance of formal earnings and magnitude of earnings management are examined from a perspective of earnings quality. Finally, from a perspective of auditor conservatism, we focus on the effects of management earnings forecasts on auditor's response to different types of management earnings forecasts and their response to the related disclosure strategies and disclosre quality. The typical features of the project include: the heterogeneity of different types of management earnings forecasts in Chinese listed companies is emphasized; comprehensive disclosure quality indexes of management earnings forecasts are constructed from the perspective of information users; the complementing and verifying effects of management earnings forecasts on the value relevance of formal accounting earnings are proposed and examined particularly; and the effects of management earnings forecasts on auditors' external and internal conservatism are considered using both archival and experimental research methods. Related research findings are expected to provide valuable decision supports and policy suggestions for listed companies, investors, auditors and regulators.

业绩预告是由管理层在定期报告公布前对当期会计盈余进行的预先估计和披露。除少数自愿披露外，中国上市公司的业绩预告都属于强制要求下的预告亏损、预告扭亏、大幅预增和大幅预减等类型。本项目针对不同类型的业绩预告，具体分析和评价中国上市公司管理层的披露策略和披露质量；并从公司治理角度考察股东、董事会和管理层对各种业绩预告信息披露的治理效应；从盈余质量角度检验业绩预告对盈余管理程度和报告会计盈余的价值相关性的影响；最后从审计师谨慎性角度研究审计师对不同类型业绩预告及其披露策略和披露质量的反应。项目特色在于考虑了中国上市公司业绩预告的异质性，基于信息用户视角构建业绩预告披露质量指数，提出并检验业绩预告对会计盈余价值相关性的互补与互证效应，采用实证与实验研究相结合的方法考察业绩预告对审计师外在和内在谨慎性的影响。预期研究结论可为上市公司、投资者、审计师和监管者提供决策支持和政策建议。

业绩预告是由公司管理层在定期财务报告公布前对即期会计盈余进行的预先估计和披露。中国上市公司管理层业绩预告属于自愿和强制并存的情形，公司管理层在业绩预告信息的披露策略和披露质量上具有较大的自由裁量权。这就使得业绩预告信息的披露策略和披露质量存在很大差异，为研究管理层业绩预告及其影响提供机会和空间。本项目包含四部分研究内容，即：基于业绩预告异质性的上市公司披露策略与披露质量研究；公司治理对业绩预告披露策略与披露质量的影响研究；管理层业绩预告对报告会计盈余质量影响的研究；管理层业绩预告对审计师谨慎性影响的研究。.目前大部分研究计划的实质内容已顺利完成，取得了相应的研究结果及研究结论。例如，对于业绩预告的影响因素，我们实证考察了股权特征、两职合一、总经理和财务总监特征以及并购活动等对业绩预告信息披露的影响，发现了一些显著实证关系。对于业绩预告的经济后果，我们考察了其对公司资本成本、短期市场反应和会计盈余价值相关性的影响。总体上，我们发现公司自愿业绩预告、高质量的业绩预告信息披露以及适当的业绩预告策略等，具有显著的短期市场信息含量，有助于降低公司资本成本，能提升会计盈余的价值相关性。部分业绩预告特征对以审计收费为代理变量的审计谨慎性能产生显著影响；而公司之前年份收到的不利审计意见对管理层业绩预告也会产生重要影响。未来我们还将进一步深化和拓展基于业绩预告影响因素和经济后果的相关研究。.本项目有关实证研究结论对于分析我国上市公司管理层业绩预告行为特征、影响因素及其经济后果，评价和总结我国有关管理层业绩预告的现行监管政策具有一定参考价值，并可为上市公司、投资者、审计师和监管者提供决策支持和政策建议。