公共项目创新激励机制研究：基于不完全契约动态性的视角

In the real life public projects, not all the responsibilities could be stipulated in a simple contract. Particularly, the contract may remain incomplete throughout the interaction between the principal and the agents; hence, organization design and control rights matter in such a scenario. This issue is especially relevant in transition economy. Public-private partnership is a novel mode of arranging the collaboration between the governmental agencies and the private firms to deliver public services. In a typical PPP project, a single firm takes charge of all involved tasks, such as building and maintaining the facility; moreover, the control rights are kept in the hand of the private firm. In this research project, we will reexamine the proper scope of PPPs, and investigate the optimal arrangement regarding bundling versus unbundling and private ownership versus public ownership. In a dynamic principal-agnet model, we assume that the innovative activity in the building stage has impacts on, among other things, the subsequent operational cost. The novelty is that we relax the nature of task interdependence and study different contractual frameworks. The general insight is that given limitation in contractibility, contrary to common sense, complementarity between tasks favors unbundling over bundling. Moreover, builidng on the the theoretical findings and using the suvey data of 36 cities in China that is conducted by Asia Development Bank, we will apply the stochastical structural model approach to do empirical test.

无论是国内政策还是全球趋势，近年来都鼓励私人部门积极参与公共项目的设计、建设与运营。因此，研究私人部门参与公共品提供的创新激励机制具有重要意义。不仅要鼓励其参与，还要调动他们进行各种创新的积极性，约束其不当的市场化行为。我们将结合公共项目创新与转轨经济的特点，建立基于任务复杂关联与不完全契约动态演进的多任务委托-代理模型，分析与比较各种激励机制下创新投入的效率，研究最优激励创新的契约结构。在理论模型研究的基础上，我们将提出可供检验的随机结构方程模型，并运用亚洲开发银行关于中国36 个城市公共项目施工、运营与服务质量调查的数据进行实证检验。因此，这一课题的成果将发展有关公共项目创新激励机制的理论与实证的研究。

本项目将不完全契约理论应用到公共项目创新激励机制设计的研究，建立了基于任务复杂关联与不完全契约动态演进的多任务委托-代理模型，分析与比较了各种激励机制下创新投入的效率，研究了最优激励创新的契约结构。在理论模型研究的基础上，我们设计了可供检验的随机结构方程模型，并通过问卷调查和实地访谈，收集了2005年至2015年中国19个城市211个公共项目的施工、运营与服务质量、用户满意度等数据，实证检验了创新投资效率与项目属性、契约结构之间的关联。本课题研究取得的成果发表在Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics、Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization、Journal of Regional Science等国际知名期刊，以及《经济研究》等国内知名期刊。本项目关于公共项目创新机制的研究，不仅为后续学者开展这一问题的理论研究提供了基本方法和分析框架，也为政府决策部门优化公共品提供机制提出了诸多可操作的政策建议。