排放权总量控制与交易环境下竞争供应链协调策略研究

Given the globalization of business economy, the competition is changing from “firm vs. firm” to “supply chain vs. supply chain”. The Cap-and-Trade(C&T) framework for greenhouse emission brings new development opportunities as well as new challenges for competing supply chain management. The interaction of C&T and traditional competition market provides profit incentives for the firms to conduct some strategies such as green technology improvement, carbon market trade, differentiation production, vertical cooperation and so on. On the other hand, such environment gradually nurtures the multi-risk, for example, demand risk, supply risk, emission trade price risk and green improvement risk. The issue of operational optimization and vertical collaboration for competing supply chains under C&T system are very important, which is not yet yielded by academic research. From the prospect of the Game theory, this study will construct two supply chains competing in a common market, and each supply chain consists of one manufacturer with emission allowance and one exclusive retailer. By comparatively analyzing the equilibrium decisions as well as the profits for various chain to chain competitions, the competing supply chains coordination contract choice game is studied. Furthermore, we will analyze the multi-risk and the corresponding hedging strategies. Finally, the theory conclusions will be verified by the empirical analysis. The expected results will solve the optimization problems for both production operations and coordination under the complicated multi-risk environment generated by the interaction of C&T and market competition. As a consequence, this study possesses very important value in theory and practice.

经济全球化使竞争格局从“企业之间的竞争”演变至“供应链之间的竞争”，针对温室气体排放权的总量控制与交易(Cap-and-Trade，C&T)框架体系则为竞争供应链管理带来了新的机遇和挑战：C&T与传统竞争市场相结合，促使企业进行绿色改进、排放权交易、差异化生产、纵向合作等策略以实现经济效益增长，同时也引发了供需、碳市场价格和绿色改进等多源风险。C&T环境下竞争供应链运作优化与协调合作的研究尚属理论空白，成为亟待解决的重要问题。本项目拟基于博弈论的视角，构建两个拥有碳排放配额的制造商和两个排他性零售商构成的链与链竞争模型；通过比较分析不同链与链竞争结构下的均衡决策与绩效，分析竞争供应链协调合同选择博弈均衡，并进行多源风险及其对冲策略的研究；最后通过实证研究验证所得理论结果。本项目预期研究结果可以有效解决C&T与市场竞争叠加的复杂风险环境下供应链的生产运营与协调优化问题，具有理论和实践价值。

针对温室气体排放权的总量控制与交易框架体系为竞争供应链管理带来了新的机遇和挑战：C&T与传统竞争市场相结合，促使企业采取绿色改进、排放权交易、纵向合作等策略以实现经济效益增长，同时也引发了供需、碳市场价格、绿色改进等多源不确定风险。C&T环境下竞争供应链渠道管理和协调合同设计成为亟待解决的重要问题。本项目基于博弈论的视角，构建两个拥有碳排放配额的制造商和两个排他性零售商构成的链与链竞争模型。通过比较分析不同链与链竞争模式下的均衡决策与绩效，考察竞争供应链占优渠道结构策略和协调合同设计，揭示产品竞争、碳权交易价格、绿色技术、售后服务等因素对竞争供应链协调合同选择均衡及其均衡性质的影响。所得系列研究成果丰富了传统竞争供应链协调管理的理论研究，为传统市场经济和绿色经济环境下供应链渠道管理实践提供改进方向。