非授权渠道窜货的供应链分析

"Unauthorized transshipment" occurs when dealers or intermediaries transship products across territories to make profits, thus causing unauthorized flow of goods. In China, unauthorized transshipment is a common phenomeon and takes various forms. It happens when dealers sell products across regions. With the advent of online sales, unauthorized transshipment happens when traditional dealers acquire low priced products from Internet retailers and re-sell to local customers, or when an Internet retailer acquires goods at discount from a traditional dealer and re-sell online. In addition, the emergence of International purchasing agents has also attracted attentions from the public and the government. In reality, unauthorized transshipment has not only caused conflict between manufacturers and distributors, but also make the traditional distributors try to force-out the Internet retailers. The new customs policy regarding International purchasing agency has also caused controversy. Therefore, unauthorized transshipment is an important issue both in practice and in theory. Based on theoretical modeling and case analysis, this project aims to make in-depth investigation on unauthorized transshipping (including smuggled goods/ international purchasing agency,transshipment among dealers, and transshipment that involves Internet retailers), and its impacts on firm profits and consumer surplus. The outcomes of this project will be used for reference to manufacturers in managing their distribution channels and coping with intermediaries' unauthorized transshipping behavior, and to the government in making customs policy regarding international purchasing agency.

"窜货"是指公司的分支机构或者中间商受到利益驱动，将产品进行跨区域销售的现象。在中国市场，窜货很常见，并表现出多种形式。有分销商违背协议跨地区销售；也有些是网上商城的低/零毛利商品被经销商获取并进行"二次销售"；还有的是网上商城获取传统经销商门店的促销产品，转而网上出售；此外，还有国际代购这种引起社会和管理部门关注的窜货现象。现实中，窜货不仅造成制造商和经销商的矛盾冲突，也引发传统经销商联手封杀网络商城。而针对海外代购这种窜货的新政策更引起社会热议和两会关注。因此，窜货是企业在渠道管理和分区域定价等决策中要面对的重要问题。本项目将通过理论建模结合案例分析，深入研究非授权渠道的窜货（包括水货/国际代购、分销商窜货、网上商城窜货/被窜货）对厂商/经销商利润和消费者福利的影响。期望研究结果为厂商的分区域定价和控制窜货，传统分销商面对网络窜货时应该采取的竞争策略，和对海外代购的控税政策等提出建议。

本项目研究了窜货的供应链模型。（1）通过数学建模，研究制造商如何限制经销商窜货。经销商窜货是一种共谋行为，我们研究发现制造商开设直销渠道可以更好的限制经销商窜货。有趣的发现时，在有些情况下，制造商不一定需要真正开设直销渠道，但是其具备的直销能力可以震慑经销商，使其打消共谋的企图。在这种情况下，制造商仍然完全依赖经销商销售产品，而经销商也会放弃窜货的企图。（2）我们进一步研究窜货对制造商可能的正面影响，并为制造商提出积极管理窜货的决策建议。我们考虑与其限制或默许经销商窜货、转运，不如制造商更积极的管理分销，甚至主动实施转运。因此，我们提出了由供应商主导的转运模式，给出了一类新型价格配置方式，该机制的运用可以实现分销商间的主动转运，优化资源配置，有效提升供应链运作效率，实现供应链完美协调。该研究为企业管理者科学合理的管理分销渠道和窜货现象提供了科学合理的决策依据。（3）对于“水货”和国际代购的行为，我们发现国际品牌商和零售商已经开始积极应对。很多零售商不再像以往一样简单的进入国际市场，在当地开店并实施歧视定价，而是允许其他国家的消费者跨境购物。此时，消费者可以享受一致的价格，也避免了购买水货或代购的风险。但分销商的跨境销售对制造商而言也是一种窜货行为，这可能破坏制造商在不同国家的歧视定价策略。受到这种商业现象的启发，我们构建模型，研究了零售商或分销商跨境经销的现象。研究发现当两个市场消费者的产品价值差别不大时，分销商跨境销售对制造商有利。反之，当两个市场消费者的产品价值差别较大时，制造商的利润会因为分销商跨境销售而受损。