内部控制、EVA考核与国有企业非效率投资治理：基于代理理论和信息不对称理论视角的研究

With the rapid growth of Chinese economy, two inefficient investment phenomena, over-investment and under-investment, emerged in State-Owned Enterprises(SOEs), which not only influenced the value creation and sustainable growth of SOEs, but also threatened the steady and sound development of macroeconomy. Thus, the governance of investment inefficiency of SOEs has been a burning realistic problem in China's economic development. To tackle investment inefficiency, sound internal control and effective EVA appraisal have been considered really significant. On the background of Chinese regime, this project first summarizes the main causes and governing measures of investment inefficiency of SOEs. Based on agency theory and asymmetric information, we illustrate the internal logic among internal control, EVA appraisal and investment inefficiency governance from a view of strengthening restraints and motivation to managerial bahavior. Then we investigate the different mechanisms and systematic effect of internal control and EVA, and empirically test their respective governing effects and systematic effect to investment inefficiency via discrete choice models based on panel data, so that we build the systematic governing mechanisms of internal control and EVA to investment inefficiency. Finally, by summarizing the research conclusions and empirical evidence, we offer a targeted policy proposal which assures the improvement, fulfillment and coordination of internal control standards and EVA appraisal methods.

伴随着我国经济的高速增长，国有企业出现投资过度和投资不足两种非效率投资现象，不仅影响企业价值创造和可持续增长，而且影响宏观经济的持续健康发展。因此，如何治理国有企业的非效率投资已成为中国经济发展亟待解决的现实问题。而良好的内部控制和有效的EVA考核被寄予厚望。本项目拟以代理理论和信息不对称理论为依据，结合中国的制度背景，在梳理国有企业非效率投资的主要动因及其治理路径的基础上，从强化对管理层行为的约束与激励角度，揭示内部控制、EVA考核和国有企业非效率投资治理之间的内在逻辑，深入考察二者发挥作用的不同机理及两者之间的协同互补性，并采用基于面板数据的离散选择模型实证检验二者对非效率投资的治理效应及其协同效应，从而构建内部控制和EVA考核对国有企业非效率投资的协同治理机制。最后，在总结研究结论和经验证据的基础上对我国企业内控规范和EVA考核办法的完善、落实与协调提出有针对性的政策建议

本项目紧扣新一轮国企改革“以管资本为主加强国有资产监管”、企业内部控制建设逐步发展、全面推进管理会计体系建设等制度背景，从强化对管理层行为的约束与激励的角度，分别剖析了内部控制和EVA考核治理国有企业非效率投资的约束机制和激励机制，并对二者的治理效应以及内外部制度因素的影响进行了系统的实证检验；在此基础上，揭示内部控制、EVA考核和国有企业非效率投资治理之间的内在逻辑，深入探究二者各自作用的区别与联系及其协同互补性，搭建起内部控制与EVA考核协同治理非效率投资的理论分析框架，并对协同治理效应进行了实证检验。本项目研究的理论价值包括：其一，探索性地将内部控制与EVA考核纳入同一个理论分析框架，并获得了关于两者协同治理国有企业非效率投资的经验数据支撑，有利于拓展非效率投资治理的研究视角；其二，创造性地提出整合“要素观”、“目标观”与“缺陷观”，兼顾科学性与可操作性的内控质量度量新思路，并据此构建内部控制指数，同时引入薪酬EVA敏感性这一新指标来度量国有企业激励机制的有效性，将相关实证研究推向纵深。本项目研究的现实意义在于：其一，有助于监管部门与国有企业进一步完善、落实与协调内部控制规范与EVA考核制度；其二，有助于以管资本为主加强国有资产监管，为国有企业非效率投资协同治理的路径设计提供理论支撑和经验支持，助推新一轮国有企业改革。