声誉与独立董事制度的有效性——基于行为视角的研究

The classic literature of corporate finance considers reputation incentives as the cornerstone of effective operation of independent director system. In China, can reputation give sufficient motivation that promotes independent directors to exercise their supervision functions? If reputation incentive did exist, how does it influence professional behavior and decision-making process of the independent directors? This research intends to proceed from these basic questions and explores the nature, influence mechanism and efficiency of the independent director's reputation incentive system. Firstly, we will verify the effectiveness of the reputation incentive on China's independent director labor market, to fill in the theoretical gap in the literature of independent director studies. A dynamic model will be build up then and relevant empirical analysis will be tested on the effect of reputation on independent directors' professional behaviors. Through these, the project will investigate the reputation's role in independent directors' selection process and in their monitoring behaviors, which would affect the efficiency of corporate governance role played by independent directors. This study will enrich the theory of independent director incentive mechanism, and meanwhile provide new evidence for the effectiveness of informal contracts in corporate governance. By proposing and validating the "two sides" nature of independent directors' decision-making process, the project contributes to the interests of stakeholders in better understanding and predicting the behavior and the consequences of the independent directors. Also it will provide policy recommendations for regulators to improve the independent director system, and offer reference to those companies intend to improve the selection and corporate governance mechanism of independent directors.

经典财务文献把声誉激励视为独立董事制度有效运行的基石。在我国声誉机制是否能激励独立董事发挥其监督职能？声誉激励如果存在，它是如何影响独立董事的职业行为和决策效果的？本项目拟从这些本质问题出发，探析独立董事声誉激励制度的内涵、影响机理和效率。本项目首先验证了声誉机制与我国劳动力市场的有效性，弥补了独立董事激励机制理论研究的空白。通过声誉对独立董事任职行为影响的动态模型分析与实证检验，探讨了声誉如何影响独立董事的选聘结果、激励其行使监督职能，进而影响独立董事监督机制的公司治理效率。本项目的研究丰富和发展了独立董事激励机制的理论，为研究非正式契约对我国公司治理效率的影响积累新的证据；提出并验证了独立董事决策权衡中的"两面性"，有助于利益相关者更好地了解和预测独立董事的行为及后果；从监管层面为完善独立董事制度提供政策建议，并为公司设计合理的独立董事选拔机制和公司治理制度提供参考。

声誉激励是独立董事制度有效性的基石。本研究分别从独立董事的聘任、职能发挥和声誉维护等角度考量了声誉激励对独立董事职业选择和任职上市公司的影响。课题组首先从劳动力市场的“事后清付”角度，以上市公司违约公告作为切入点，考察了声誉激励的劳动力市场有效性。为克服独董聘任中可能存在的内生性问题，探讨了独立董事提名人差异的市场反应及对财务报告监督质量的影响。从独立董事在董事会履职的微观行为视角，直观地测量了独立董事如何基于不同的声誉激励动机分配宝贵的精力和人力资源。独立董事声誉的内涵源于其行业背景专长、职业经验和拥有的社会资本，课题组进一步从以下方面探讨了独立董事声誉内涵对上市公司的影响：考察了具有不同财务专长的独立董事在上市公司内部控制实施和信息质量方面发挥的监督作用；从行业专长、教育背景、职位声望、职业经验等四个声誉维度，检验了独立董事对于企业技术创新的监督和咨询功能；从债务融资、税收优惠及研发投入强度三个角度考察行政背景独立董事对民营企业价值的影响路径和经济后果；最后还从董事网络和异地独董两个角度，分别考察了独立董事的社会资本对企业技术创新和高管薪酬契约有效性的影响。课题组的研究全面考察了声誉激励的有效性及微观行为影响、声誉内涵的本质和功能，以及上市公司进行独董选择的决策动机，为完善独立董事制度提供了实证和理论依据。