供应链中供应商信息泄露问题行为研究

In supply chains, it is common that one supplier provides products and services for multiple downstream firms who compete in their market, for instance, the Fujiton manufactures electronic products for Apple and Mi simultaneously. An information sharing between upstream and downstream firms is not avoidable, which induces a hazard of sensitive information which is leaked by a supplier to other competitors. This project theoretically and experimentally investigates the supplier and retailers' decisions in varied environments. With the hypotheses derived from theoretical literature and the models established by this project, running experiments is to test them and to provide behavioral evidence for constructing a model associated with reasonable behavioral factors. There are many non-economic factors which may play an important role in this information leakage problem, such as, guilty aversion, reciprocity, mental accounting, etc. Besides, cheap talks and capacity decisions are also considered in this project, which has not been discussed in the literature yet. This project will contribute an understanding of supplier's information leakage problem from the perspectives of theory and behavior, which could also provide managerial insights in practice.

在当代供应链中，一家供应商常为多家在市场上有竞争关系的下游企业提供产品和服务，比如富士康同时为小米和苹果提供制造服务。而上下游企业间不可避免地会有敏感信息的共享，因此也存在供应商将一位下游厂商的市场敏感信息泄露给其他下游厂商的风险。本项目通过理论研究并结合实验行为的方法，对在不同环境中供应商的信息泄露和零售商的订购决策进行研究。在文献已有的以及本项目将建立的理论模型的基础上，用实验的方法，验证理论假设或再依据行为特征提出合适的行为模型。观察分析一些非经济因素，如内疚厌恶、互惠互利、心理账户等，对各方决策和均衡的影响。另外，在现有理论框架下，讨论当泄露信息不可验真的情况，以及供应商需要进行产能决策的情况，在理论和行为上进一步完善当前文献中对供应商泄露问题的研究，为供应链中信息泄露问题的管理提供新的启发。

本项目对在竞争性的零售商供应链环境下，对供应商的信息泄露问题进行了实验方法的研究。其中强势零售商知道市场的状态并提前向供应商订货。收益共享合作在理性环境下能防止供应商泄露强势零售商的订货信息给弱势零售商。我们通过设计实验，在实验环境下发现收益共享合约并没有如同理性模型展现的那样防止供应商泄露信息。相对的，利益共享合约与批发价合约在供应链剩余方面并没有显著差异。我们通过进一步设计新的实验，逐步分解该非理性行为。我们发现弱势零售商对市场真实状态的模糊厌恶能够对供应商在收益共享合约下的泄露行为有系统性的解释。