机构投资者的公司治理效应：基于高管变更的视角

In China’s capital market with high concentration of equity, institutional investor actively participating in corporate governance is widely regarded as a kind of new governance mechanism, and gets great expectations from related government departments such as China Securities Regulatory Commission. What kind of role have Institutional investors exactly played in corporate governance? This problem has not been effectively answered. Based on the system environment of China, from the perspective of top management turnover, using theoretical analysis, stochastic frontier analysis (SFA), propensity score matching (PSM) model, and other research methods, we analyze the decisions choice of institutional investors participating in corporate governance, and determine the critical point of institutional investors choosing “free-rider” behavior. We study whether institutional investors have effects on agency costs and firm performance by intervening in top management turnover, and whether the performance after top management turnover affects holding stocks decisions of the institutional investors. This project clarifies the way and path in which institutional investors play corporate governance effect. Based on specific governance scenarios of top management turnover, the research helps to more accurately understand the role mechanism of institutional investors in the field of corporate governance, and perfects research framework on governance effect from institutional investor. This project has important theoretical value and practical significance in promoting the development normally of institutional investors in participating in corporate governance, and in improving the efficiency of corporate governance of listed companies.

机构投资者的崛起是全球金融体系近30年来最重大的变化之一，其公司治理效应一直是实务界和学术界讨论的热点议题。尤其在股权高度集中的中国资本市场，机构投资者在公司治理中到底发挥了何种作用？该问题一直未能得到有效的回答。本项目创建一个基于高管变更视角的机构投资者治理效应研究框架，揭示机构投资者参与公司治理的方式和路径。实证检验机构投资者如何选择治理决策，不同的治理决策如何影响高管变更进而影响代理成本和公司业绩，高管变更机制效率是否影响机构投资者的持股决策。基于高管变更特定治理场景的研究,有助于更准确地理解机构投资者在公司治理领域的作用机制，对于推动机构投资者参与公司治理的规范化发展，提高上市公司治理效率具有重要的理论价值和现实意义。

研究从高管变更的视角，探讨机构投资者是否通过干预高管变更对代理成本和公司业绩产生影响，以及高管变更后的业绩对机构持股的影响，厘清机构投资者发挥公司治理效应的方式和路径，一定程度上揭示了机构投资者影响公司价值“黑箱”内部的作用机理。研究结果主要回答了如下问题：第一，机构投资者在多大程度上能够影响公司高管人员的变更？第二，公司高管一旦发生变更，又会对公司价值和机构投资者的持股决策产生怎样的影响？研究发现：第一，对于那些业绩亏损的公司，机构投资者的撤离能够形成较强的外部压力，迫使当任高管离职。而对于那些业绩仍然维持盈利的公司，机构投资者的施压作用则不明显。总体上，业绩好坏始终是公司高管被迫离任的主要原因，而机构投资者则是通过“用脚投票”的方式起到了推波助澜的作用。第二，高管强制变更会被机构投资者解读为负面信号，新高管的上任并不会挽回机构投资者的持股信心。第三，噪音交易者(中小个体投资者)倾向于将亏损公司的高管变更事件解读为利好消息，其踊跃买入行为则构成了公司股价在高管强制变更后发生波动加剧现象的直接原因。.研究立足于中国制度环境与股权分置改革后的金融市场，搭建了一个基于高管变更视角的机构投资者公司治理效应的理论框架，正确评估了我国市场环境下机构投资者的治理角色以及治理作用的大小，为相关部门的政策制定提供理论借鉴与实证参考。