关键设备维修服务性能合同设计与激励行为研究

Maintaining a high level of system availability is of the utmost important footstone for production profit to many firms operating mission-critical equipment, which is the common effort outcome by the firm and service suppliers. After representative cases of maintenance service involved firms and service supplier are investigated in practice, three new characteristics for maintenance service contract design problem are proposed. The first is a non-stationary repair demand due to the increment of the fleet. The service contract design problem with non-stationary demand is proposed using a sequential game formulation. It is answered how two type contracts and the ownership structure of spare parts inventory motivate the supplier to invest the service ability. Secondly,considering the pertinence of repair between multiple subsystems, performance-based contract (PBC) coordinated design problem between one firm and multiple subsystem suppliers is presented using the biform game formulation. The behavior is studied how the firm accurately incentivizes multiple suppliers to invest in reliability. Finally, considering the risk of production profit damaged severely by malfunction, the contract design problem integrated business interruption insurance (BI) and PBC contract is proposed using the traditional game formulation. The relationship between BI and supplier's service operational measures is to explore. Our proposed problems is innovative and the methodologies adopted in the proposal are feasible and scientifical . The expected results have strong theoretical values, which finally form new ideas for service contract design. Expected results will provide the tools and methodologies for maintenance service practices.

关键设备高可靠性水平运行是运营商和服务供应商共同努力的结果，它是运营商获取生产收益的根本保障。通过对关键设备运营和维修服务典型企业调研，提炼出维修服务合同设计三类新问题：考虑设备分批服役导致的维修需要非稳态特征，研究面向非稳态维修需求的服务合同设计序贯博弈模型，探索不同类型合同和备件库存所有权对激励供应商投资各项服务能力的行为机制；考虑多部件之间的维修相关性特征，提出运营商与多个供应商之间的服务性能合同（PBC）协同设计竞合博弈模型，探讨运营商精准激励多个供应商协同投资部件可靠性的行为规律；考虑设备故障严重损失生产收益情景，研究业务中断保险与PBC合同集成设计博弈模型，探索业务中断保险与供应商服务能力投资之间互动行为规律。所提炼的研究问题具有创新性，研究方法具有科学性和可行性，研究成果具有较强的理论价值，最终形成维修服务合同设计新思想方法，为关键设备维修服务合同决策提供科学依据和指导。

近年关键设备制造企业商业模式向服务化转型势不可挡，性能服务合同（PBC）是管理制造商与用户服务关系的重要工具。本项目在关键设备PBC 合同与业务中断保险集成设计及激励机制、PBC合同下非稳态维修需求的运维服务策略及系统设计、运营商与多个供应商服务PBC合同协同设计及激励行为等方面取得重要进展。针对关键设备突发长时间停机风险造成运营商严重生产收益及资金流风险问题，我们首次提出采用业务中断保险作为资金风险减缓机制，分别考虑闭环可维修备件服务系统、低频高风险故障特征、设备性能持续退化等关键设备应用情景，研究了PBC与RBC合同最优设计，获得保险与合同类型的激励交互机制，它是服务运作与保险跨界研究新尝试；针对市场扩张期的新型设备性能服务问题，由于装机台数在多个区域以不同速度递增，导致备件与维修需求非线性增长，我们提出一种自适应分段近似方法将时变备件需求处理为多阶段稳定需求，分类考虑消耗性备件(Q, R)库存策略、可维修性备件（S-1,S）基库存策略，采用分级性能服务收益函数，建立自适应多阶段备件库存策略优化模型，给出有效求解方法，分析了装机速度和故障率对服务收益的影响规律以及性能服务模式的意义。在上述主要研究成果基础上，在管理科学部认定的A类期刊《系统工程理论与实践》《中国管理科学》《系统管理学报》上发表论文3篇以及计算机类重要期刊《计算机集成制造系统》上发表论文1篇，在运营管理与信息管理领域国际期刊《Enterprise Information Systems》、《Annals of Operation Research》发表SSCI&SCI检索论文3篇。在国际运营管理主流A类期刊《European Journal of Operational Research》、《International Journal of Production Research》投稿论文2篇，其中在EJOR 期刊论文已经完成第一轮修改工作。在项目执行期间培养硕士研究生13名。本项目取得理论成果，特别在备件库存策略优化方面逐渐向企业推广应用。