基于职工利益保护的政府管制、劳动力成本与微观企业产业升级研究

For the purpose of the protection of employee interest, government passed laws such Labor Contract Law and Minimum Wage Law regulating compensation and corresponding power for employees, which leads to a large rigid increase of labor cost in firms to a certain degree. Many firms set out to upgrade industry because of the increasing labor cost. Motivated by this background, this study considers the effect of the macro-regulation policy on the micro firm-level behavior. Based on theories such as government regulation and stakeholder, we mainly use the method of large sample study to analyze the impact of government regulation pro protection of employee interest on the labor cost of micro firms, test the correlation between the labor cost and industrial upgrading and the factors influencing the correlation, and explore the transmission mechanism of the influence of government regulation on the micro firm-level behavior. All attempts are to achieve the final goal of protecting employee interest. This study mainly focuses on the following issues: 1. The impacts of strengthening employee power incurred by government regulation on the labor cost; 2. The driving function of the increasing labor cost on the industrial upgrading in micro firms; 3. Factors weighing against the relationship between the labor cost and industrial upgrading; 4. The economic consequences of industrial upgrading..This study enriches literatures on government regulation, corporate governance, and stakeholder and so on. This study tests the external economy of the regulation policy on employee compensation, which is helpful for understanding the industrial upgrading behavior for firms in China better, and also for protecting employee interest better.

出于职工利益保护的目的，政府通过《劳动合同法》、《最低工资法》等法律规范了职工薪酬待遇和相应权力，这在一定程度上导致企业劳动力成本大幅度刚性上涨，很多企业因此进行产业升级。基于此，本课题考虑宏观管制政策对微观企业行为的影响，基于政府管制、利益相关者等理论，主要采用大样本实证研究的方法，分析基于职工利益保护的政府管制对微观企业劳动力成本的影响，检验劳动力成本与产业升级的相关性及其二者关系的影响因素，探索政府管制对微观企业行为影响的传导机制，最终回归于职工利益保护。主要内容包括：1、因政府管制而导致的职工权力增加对劳动力成本的影响；2、劳动力成本上涨对微观企业产业升级的驱动作用；3、劳动力成本与产业升级关系的影响因素；4、产业升级的经济后果。.本课题丰富了政府管制、公司治理以及利益相关者保护等方面的文献，检验了职工薪酬管制的外部经济性，有助于更好地理解中国企业产业升级行为和进行职工利益保护。

出于职工利益保护的目的，政府通过《劳动合同法》、《最低工资法》等法律规范了职工薪酬待遇和相应权力，这在一定程度上导致企业劳动力成本大幅度刚性上涨，很多企业因此进行产业升级。基于此，本课题考虑宏观管制政策对微观企业行为的影响，基于政府管制、利益相关者等理论，主要采用大样本实证研究的方法，分析基于职工利益保护的政府管制对微观企业劳动力成本的影响，检验劳动力成本与产业升级的相关性及其二者关系的影响因素，探索政府管制对微观企业行为影响的传导机制，最终回归于职工利益保护。本课题利用中国上市公司的劳动力成本等相关数据，主要内容包括：1、因政府管制而导致的职工权力增加对劳动力成本的影响；2、劳动力成本上涨对微观企业产业升级的驱动作用；3、宏观环境如空气质量、人口老龄化等对企业劳动力成本的影响以及企业的应对；4、隐性契约在人力资源激励和企业行为中的作用。研究发现：1）五险一金在职工薪酬总额中占比例较大，《劳动合同法》激发职工维权意识。进一步研究发现，是《社会保险法》和《住房公积金管理条例》增加了企业劳动力成本，而不是《劳动合同法》；2）劳动力成本的提高倒逼企业进行研发创新，部分企业通过内迁等方式进行产业转移，提升企业价值；3）空气质量的恶化导致企业劳动力成本上升，企业积极应对有利于企业价值的提高；4）人口老龄化增加了地方政府的养老压力，破坏了地方政府与企业在养老金缴纳方面的隐性契约，导致企业养老支出增加。.本课题丰富了政府管制、公司治理以及利益相关者保护等方面的文献，检验了职工薪酬管制的外部经济性，有助于更好地理解中国企业产业升级行为和进行职工利益保护。