供应商社会责任风险下的制造商采购竞争与信息共享及披露策略研究

Corporate social responsibility has received a lot of attention from society. This project investigates the optimal competitive strategies under the supplier responsibility risk from the manufacturers’ perspective. Inspired by the industrial practice, we study competing manufacturers’ sourcing strategies and the incentives of sharing audit information and disclosing supplier information. We will develop multi-stage game-theoretic models, conduct analysis by backward induction, and derive the equilibrium outcome. We will characterize the firm’s equilibrium strategies of sourcing and information sharing/information disclosure, and discuss how firm’s strategies and profits depend on key factors, such as the competition, information structures and etc. We will also obtain insights on the effectiveness of information sharing or disclosure on reducing social responsibility risk in the supply chains. To the best of our knowledge, this project will be the first to investigate the effect of information sharing/disclosure on firms’ sourcing strategies under competition. The findings from the project can contribute to the socially responsible supply chain literature. Moreover, they can provide managerial insights on industrial practice and regulatory advice to the government.

企业社会责任已倍受社会各方关注。本项目从制造商的视角出发，研究如何应对和控制供应链中的社会责任风险，制定竞争策略。结合对实践的观察分析与对文献的研究梳理，本项目选择重点关注竞争中品牌制造商如何利用供应商社会责任审核信息来做出最优采购决策，以及形成审核信息共享协议或者披露的成因与条件。项目组将建立多阶段博弈模型，采用逆序归纳的方法分析求解均衡策略及其条件，并探讨竞争、信息结构等因素如何影响其均衡策略和利润，以及信息的共享或披露对提高供应链责任的有效性。从理论上，这是对已有研究空白的补充，是对社会责任型供应链中的采购竞争、审核信息共享与披露等问题创新性理论探。从应用上，研究所得到的结论既有助于为企业的实践提供更优化的策略，也可为政府机构制定相关政策提供理论依据。

随着消费者对企业社会责任的要求不断提高，供应商社会责任风险水平已经成为大型制造商间的关键竞争要素。不少行业已经形成了信息共享联盟，专门共享共同供应商的责任风险审核结果。本项目致力于研究制造商应当如何运用供应商审核信息做出最优采购竞争决策、以及形成信息共享联盟的动机与条件。项目根据预定研究计划展开，通过综合运用博弈论、信息经济学等方法，完成了供应商选择模型、信息共享模型和若干拓展方向的研究工作，并取得了一系列的有价值的研究结果。项目研究了定量地刻画了信息共享动机的影响因素，分析信息共享对制造商采购竞争策略的影响，并发现信息共享和采购策略均衡的非线性结构，进一步丰富了现有的横向信息共享理论和责任型供应链理论。