基于非完全理性顾客行为的排队经济学研究

Economics of queues or queueing game-theoretic analyses of various stochastic models based on non-fully rational customer behavior and behaviorial economics is an active research topic in the field of queueing theory and OR/MS from the view of economics, and it has lots of important applications in practical operations and service management problems. Different from the hypotheses of economic rationality and risk-neutral in the classical game-theoretic queueing literature, we will investigate in this proposal the economic analysis of queueing-game models with non-fully rational customers from several viewpoints, including mental accounting, choice theory, sunk cost analysis and prospect theory, aim to give a systemic study of behavioral economics based queueing-game models with non-fully rational customers under various information levels of the system. With different risk attitudes and utility functions, we will characterize different non-fully rational customers’ behaviors beyond the risk-neutral assumption. The equilibrium and socially optimal strategies of these customers will be derived and the optimal pricing mechanisms will be also investigated. Meanwhile, the applications of economics of queues in supply chain management, cognitive radio communications, warranty optimization in quality control and maintenance will be studied. The research work in this area has just started in the world and there exist very few studies in this research area. Therefore, it is very meaningful to propose and study this work both in the behavioral economics based queueing-game theory and its practice.

基于非完全理性顾客行为的排队博弈经济学理论是当前策略排队论和运筹管理领域的一个研究热点，在许多实际随机服务系统中有重要应用。本项目拟从行为经济学的角度研究具有非完全理性行为特征的排队博弈问题，与文献中顾客为完全理性、风险中立的假设不同，本项目拟利用行为经济学中的各种方法，如心帐理论、选择理论、沉积成本理论、前景理论等，研究非完全理性顾客在不同信息条件下的排队经济博弈模型及应用。本项目旨在给出非完全理性行为条件下排队经济博弈分析和随机服务系统的Nash均衡解、社会最优解及优化定价策略，及其在供应链管理、认知无线电、质量及维修性保障等系统中的应用。此方向的研究工作刚刚起步，国际上的相关研究也寥寥无几，因此，本项目无论是对排队博弈经济学理论还是其应用实践方面，都是很有意义的一项研究。

基于非完全理性顾客行为的排队博弈经济学理论是当前策略排队论和行为运筹管理领域的一个研究热点，在许多实际随机服务系统中有重要应用。本项目拟从行为经济学的角度研究具有非完全理性行为特征的排队博弈问题，与文献中顾客为完全理性、风险中立的假设不同，本项目拟利用行为经济学中的各种方法，如心帐理论、选择理论、沉积成本理论、前景理论等，研究非完全理性顾客在不同信息条件下的排队经济博弈模型及应用。本项目旨在给出非完全理性行为条件下排队经济博弈分析和随机服务系统的Nash均衡解、社会最优解及优化定价策略，及其在平台经济、供应链管理、认知无线电、质量及维修性保障等系统中的应用。国际上该领域的相关研究工作很少，因此本项目的立项研究无论是对排队博弈经济学理论还是其服务管理应用实践方面，都是很有意义的一项研究。