“特殊小股东”与上市公司治理——基于中证投服持股行权的研究

Recently the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) adopts an innovative securities regulation that its affiliated institution, China Securities Investor Services Center (CSISC), starts to hold shares of all listed firms in the Chinese capital market from 2016 and then exercise rights on firms as a common shareholder. The CSISC should play a special role in firm’s corporate governance since it has dual roles of “regulatory agency” and “minority shareholder”. Therefore, to shed light on the economic consequences of this important regulation, this project aims to investigate whether and how the CSISC’ securities regulation improves firm-level corporate governance by prohibiting majority shareholders’ tunneling activities and constraining managers’ bad news holding activities. First, we investigate the direct effect of this securities regulation. In specific, we examine whether the CSISC’s holding share activity influences corporate governance, and then whether the CSISC’s exercising shareholder rights activity influences corporate governance. Second, we use textual analysis to identify the mechanisms of different exercising shareholder right activities, such as sending shareholder comment letters, attending shareholder general meetings and attending M&A explanatory meetings. Finally, we investigate the demonstration effect of the CSISC on the other minority shareholders. Overall, this study has the following contributions: (1) it contributes to the investor protection literature from the perspective of government regulations; (2) it provides timely evidence to government regulators especially in weak investor protection countries around the world who are working on the regulatory reforms of protecting minority shareholders; and (3) it furthers our understanding of this innovative securities regulation and thus facilitates our government regulators to improve the financial regulatory system in China.

2016年2月，证监会下设的中证中小投资者服务中心（简称“中证投服”）对上市公司实施持股行权，是我国资本市场保护中小投资者合法权益的一项创新举措。中证投服作为身兼“监管机构”和“小股东”双重身份的“特殊小股东”，能否发挥对上市公司的外部监管和内部治理职能以改善公司治理，现有研究尚未触及。本课题拟从三个方面进行探索：第一，研究持股行权对公司治理的直接效应，拟分别检验分阶段持股行为和行权行为对大股东侵占和公司信息披露的影响；第二，采用文本分析法，分别探讨发送股东建议函、参加股东大会、参加重大资产重组说明会等不同行权方式的作用机理；第三，从行权意识和行权行为两个维度，研究持股行权对其他中小股东的示范效应。本课题拟从政府监管的视角拓展投资者保护领域的研究，为新兴资本市场探索中小投资者保护机制提供经验证据，同时为我国监管机构全面理解持股行权措施、健全金融监管体系提供政策启示。

2016年2月，证监会下设的中证中小投资者服务中心（简称“中证投服”）对上市公司实施持股行权，是我国资本市场保护中小投资者权益的一项创新举措。中证投服是身兼“监管机构”和“小股东”双重身份的“特殊小股东”，同时具备外部监管和内部治理职能，会对改善公司治理发挥独特作用，但现有研究尚未触及这一话题。本课题从三个方面进行探索：第一，研究持股行权对公司治理的直接效应，依次检验分阶段持股行为和行权行为能否抑制大股东侵占和改善信息披露质量；第二，采用文本分析法，研究不同行权方式的作用机制，主要包括发送股东建议函、参加股东大会和参加重大资产重组说明会；第三，从行权意识和行权行为两个维度，研究持股行权对中小股东积极行为的示范效应。本研究从政府监管视角拓展投资者保护领域研究，为新兴资本市场探索中小投资者保护机制提供经验证据，同时为我国监管机构全面理解持股行权措施、健全金融监管体系提供政策启示。