差异化的分销商激励:营销渠道中社会比较对分销商绩效的影响研究

How to attract and retain channel members, and motivate their cooperative behaviors, has been a key question in marketing channel management. Suppliers often reply on varying the level of financial rewards among resellers as a primary tool to motivate them to put in more efforts to attain higher rewards. However, the literature suggests divergent views regarding the effects of promoting a disparity in the levels of reseller rewards. On the one hand, according to agency theory, the use of varying levels of reseller rewards can incite competition for higher levels of payoffs and thus motivate the reseller to exert even more effort and a higher level of productivity. On the other hand, when taking a network perspective, researchers have found that reward variance also fuels social comparisons that confound and complicate incentive outcomes. As such, the incentive benefits of reward disparity can be offset by the costs of social comparisons arising from unequal payoffs..Accordingly, the net effect of reward disparity in incentivizing or inhibiting resellers’ performance remains unclear. To answer this question, we draw from social comparison theory and exchange governance literature to construct a contingency model, explicating how and when the net effect of reward disparity becomes negative or positive. In particular, we examine the moderating roles of the configurations of the reseller network and the features of focal exchange relationship, in the influence of reward disparity on distributor reactions. Empirically, we plan to match the archival data regarding reseller rewards and performance levels with the reseller survey data in the construction equipment industry in China to test our hypotheses. The findings will not only contribute to achieving an in-depth understanding of social comparisons within distribution channels, but also will provide an important guideline for firms in their design of more effective reward systems.

如何有效激励经销商提高业绩一直是渠道管理中的重要问题。厂商经常使用不同幅度的奖励来激励经销商，但现有研究对这种奖励的实际效应未能达成一致意见。从代理理论出发，使用差异化奖励能够引发经销商的竞争意识，进而激励他们付出更多努力。但从网络视角来看，不同水平的奖励会引发经销商的社会比较，从而使得差异化奖励的综合作用正负难辨。 .为了探究差异化奖励的净效应，本项目将奖励的差异分为个体水平和整体水平下的差异。从社会比较理论和交易治理文献出发，分别构建权变模型，来研究这两个层面的差异化奖励在何种情境下引发正向的或负向的效应。本项目还将研究分销网络系统中横向及纵向关系的特点对差异化奖励效应的调节作用。实证方面，通过工程设备行业的档案数据和调查问卷数据配对来检验相关假设。本研究旨在深度理解渠道关系中的社会比较行为，为上游企业设计更加有效的渠道激励提供指导。

如何有效激励经销商提高业绩一直是渠道管理中的重要问题。厂商经常使用不同幅度的奖励来激励经销商,但现有研究对这种奖励的实际效应未能达成一致意见。从代理理论出发,使用差异化奖励能够引发经销商的竞争意识,进而激励他们付出更多努力。但从网络视角来看,不同水平的奖励会引发经销商的社会比较,从而使得差异化奖励的综合作用正负难辨。为了探究差异化奖励的净效应,本项目将奖励的差异分为个体水平和整体水平下的差异。从社会比较理论和交易治理文献出发,分别构建权变模型,来研究这两个层面的差异化奖励在何种情境下引发正向的或负向的效应。本项目还将研究分销网络系统中横向及纵向关系的特点对差异化奖励效应的调节作用。实证方面,通过制造行业的档案数据、调查问卷数据配对和情景实验来检验相关假设。本研究旨在深度理解渠道关系中的社会比较行为,为上游企业设计更加有效的渠道激励提供指导。.在项目推进过程中，项目组根据文献背景增加了对相关的渠道惩罚和渠道网络关系的研究，并取得了丰富的论文发表成果。该项目共计取得成果11篇，其中已发表SSCI论文6篇，国际会议论文3篇，在审SSCI论文2篇。.项目实证结果表明，差异化奖励产生的社会比较对经销商既有正面影响，也有负面影响。结果也提出可能对关系产生调节作用的调节变量，并分析调节变量产生的调节作用，以达到充分理解渠道管理中的社会比较效应，为上游企业设计合理有效的奖励机制提供指导。同时，研究结果也可以帮助行业政策引导，以达到减少渠道商之间的恶性竞争，达到互相学习，互相促进，良性竞争，服务顾客。