大型零售商占主导权力时基于不同风险决策偏好下供应链契约协调策略研究

The reality of supply chain members generally are risk averse, the economy down and inventory backlog makes enterprise more risk averse. Now, large retailers in the supply chain is dominant, contradictions and conflicts between supplier and retailer is increasing; in addition, the era of competition between supply chain and supply chain has been coming, only cooperation between supplier and retailer can enhance the overall competitiveness of the supply chain. This project researches on contract coordination strategy of various typical supply chain structure based on different risk preference when the retailer has dominant power. We use game theory to research on the conditional value at risk CVaR of each member in various supply chain based on price-discount sharing contract and novel buy-back contract to coordinate the supply chain, and obtain contract coordination strategy of various typical supply chain based on different risk preference.This project studies on the effect when price-discount sharing contract (or revenue sharing contract) and wholesale price contract are adopted simultaneously, and are competing with each other on utility function of members of various typical supply chain structure.

现实供应链成员普遍是风险厌恶的，经济下行库存积压使企业更加厌恶风险。如今，大型零售商在供应链中日渐强势，零供矛盾冲突日益扩大；另外，供应链与供应链间的竞争时代已经到来，零供合作才能提升供应链整体竞争力。本课题研究零售商占主导权力时基于不同风险决策偏好情形下各种典型供应链结构的契约协调策略。我们运用博弈论研究价格折扣共享契约和新颖回购契约下各种供应链结构中各成员的条件风险价值CVaR值来协调供应链，得到各种典型供应链基于不同风险偏好的供应链契约协调策略。本项目研究价格折扣共享契约(或收益共享契约)与批发价格契约同时被采用且相互竞争对各种典型供应链结构中各成员效用函数影响的大小。

现实供应链成员普遍是风险厌恶的，经济下行库存积压使企业更加厌恶风险。如今，大型零售商在供应链中日渐强势，零供矛盾冲突日益扩大；另外，供应链与供应链间的竞争时代已经到来，零供合作才能提升供应链整体竞争力。本课题研究零售商占主导权力时基于不同风险决策偏好情形下各种典型供应链结构的契约协调策略。我们运用博弈论研究价格折扣共享契约和新颖回购契约下各种供应链结构的协调策略，得到各种典型供应链基于不同风险偏好的供应链契约协调策略。本项目研究价格折扣共享契约(或收益共享契约)与批发价格契约同时被采用且相互竞争对各种典型供应链结构中各成员效用函数影响的大小。在此项目课题支持下，目前发表了1篇EI收录期刊论文,1篇《系统工程理论与实践》期刊论文，1篇《中国管理科学》增刊论文。研究结果对供应链竞争环境下大型零售商占主导情形时的供应链协调及其物流配送有一定指导意义。