产业链协同创新多重均衡非效率粘滞与激励机制设计研究

This study focuses on the inefficient stickiness and its incentive mechanism，a low non-Pareto state in multiple equilibria and ways to avoid it, which often occur in collaborative industrial innovation. First, game theory is adopted to construct the behavior game theoretical framework, which contains 4 different structural patterns in collaborative innovation within the competing industrial chain. Secondly, classic game theory models (Stackleberg model, Dynamic AJ model and Cooper-John model) are applied to analyze the mechanism that causes firms' inefficient choices while they are making innovation decision in different collaborative patterns, and shock variables are introduced further to analyze the incentive mechanisms to avoid inefficient stickiness. Thirdly, Multitask principal-agent model and Multi-principals model are applied to describe the reasons for inefficient stickiness in different innovation collaborative structures, based on the revelation principle, the hidden information and hidden action by multiple agents with synergism preference. And contract theory is used then to discuss the optimal incentive contract for collaborative innovation by multiple agents. Finally, case study and experimental study are used by controlled experiment on decision making variables of the agents in collaborative innovation to find the results affecting multi-equilibrium. The impacts of behavior bias on multiple equilibria are compared also by digital simulations which conducted to simulate the possible nonlinear conditions in the modeling process.

本课题聚焦协同创新多重均衡的非效率粘滞问题以及避免非效率的激励机制。我们针对协同创新四种不同的结构形态，以产业链竞争为背景，运用博弈理论构建差异性协同创新结构下企业创新协同的行为博弈模型框架；其次，运用经典的博弈模型(Stackleberg 模型、动态 AJ 模型、Cooper-John 模型) 剖析不同创新协同结构下企业行为决策非效率选择的机理，并引入冲击变量研究克服非效率粘滞的激励途径；再者，依据显示性原理考察协同偏好下多委托代理人的隐藏信息和隐藏行动，采取多任务委托代理（Multitask principal-agent）方法描述创新协同行为非效率粘滞的原因，借助合同理论方法讨论多委托代理人创新协同的最优激励合同；最后，采用案例和实验的方法对于协同创新主体的行为决策变量进行控制性的实验，比较行为偏差对多重均衡的影响，并运用仿真软件对模型过程中可能的非线性条件进行数字仿真。

课题研究协同创新多重均衡以及非效率激励机制两个问题。首先基于不同的供应链结构构造了产业链协同创新多重均衡非效率问题的一般博弈分析框架，发现不同的供应链结构有着不同的博弈分析机理，对企业决策行为的影响较大；接着，区别产业链协同创新的互补性行为和替代性行为并进行非效率粘滞分析与激励机制设计，发现具有互补性行为的企业能够在消化吸收的基础上实施再创新策略和提升产业链整体的技术能力，具有替代性行为的企业能够平衡企业间的竞合关系，发挥协同机制和竞争机制的联合优势；然后，在产业链多代理人和一个委托人及多委托人和一个代理人结构下进行协同创新的非效率粘滞分析与激励机制设计，发现多委托人和多代理人结构下可通过引入“充分承诺”和“努力后再谈判”来刻画产业链协同创新动态过程中参与人的隐藏信息与隐藏行动；最后，用案例和实验的方法对协同创新主体的行为决策变量进行控制性的实验，比较行为偏差对多重均衡的影响，并运用仿真软件对模型过程中可能的非线性条件进行数字仿真。