中国地方财政隐性赤字的规模估测、风险量化与动态监管研究

The so-called "Local Hidden Fiscal Deficit" refers to the fiscal year funding gap which actually occurs in fiscal revenue and expenditue but not be displayed in fiscal statements. .Since the Asian Financial Crisis of 1998, there have been many theoretical and empirical studies on fiscal risk among academia and public sectors at home and abroad. But few studies have discussed how to evaluate and control the local hidden fiscal risk of China compatible with Chinese experiences from theoretical perspective. Based on the morphogenetic causation, transition mechanism and concrete styles of the local hidden fiscal risk of China, a new theoretical framework is designed in this project to measure the scale of hidden deficit and control fiscal risk from the concept of "risk position" and government arrears, which is better than transitional guide line system method in reflecting risk scale. The fiscal debt repayment mechanism that is derived from this theoretical framework will provide a new idea to realize dynamic regulation of fiscal dificit and prevent the conduction and accumulation of local fiscal risks to central public finance and the probability of fiscal crisis..In this project, Qualitative and quantitative methods will be used together to study the scale estimation and risk measurement method and its dynamic regalation policy of China's local hidden fiscal deficit. Firstly, the formation and conduction principles of China's local hidden fiscal deficit will be re-interpretated from the local government borrowing impulse and solvency levels. Secondly, on the basis of literaure analysis and special research, several statistical methods about Unobserved Economy will be uesd to estimate the inventory data of various types of every province's local hidden fiscal deficit. So the absolute and relative size of the local hidden fiscal deficit can be grasped systematically. Thirdly, on the basis of logic mechanism, several concepts about local hidden fiscal deficit will be interetated by mathematical methods. The theoretical modeling framework to estimate the risk scale of local hidden fiscal defict will be built and the risk scale of local hidden fiscal deficit of typical province will be quantiatively estimated by this theoretical framework. Fourthly, numerical experiment, empirical analysis and controlled experimental research methods will be utilized to study the growth and welfare efffects of local hidden fiscal deficit. Different regions will be tested the debt-paying pressure，and the behavior patterns of local officials will be observed about how to deal with their hidden fiscal deficit risks. Fifthly, on the basis of quantitative estimates, the institional system and sopporting policy recommendations to protect fiscal security will be given on the accumalated debt service reserve and the dynamic regulation on hidden fiscal deficit.

本项目将综合运用定性与定量分析方法，研究中国地方财政隐性赤字的规模估测、风险量化方法及其动态监管策略。首先，从地方政府举债冲动和偿债能力两个层面，重新解读地方政府隐性赤字形成并传导风险的基本逻辑和原理；其次，在文献分析和专项调研的基础上，综合运用多种未被观测经济统计方法，进行各类地方财政隐性赤字的分省存量数据估算，系统掌握地方财政隐性赤字的绝对和相对规模；第三，在逻辑机理分析的基础上，用数理方法阐释与地方财政隐性赤字风险相关的多种概念，构建测算地方财政隐性赤字风险额度的理论模型框架，并对代表性省市的财政隐性赤字风险进行量化测度；第四，采用数值试验、计量检验、受控实验研究等方法，测算地方财政隐性赤字的增长及福利效应，并对不同区域进行偿债压力测试，观察地方官员处理隐性赤字风险的行为模式；第五，在定量测算的基础上，提出滚存偿债准备金、动态监管隐性赤字从而保障财政安全的制度体系及配套政策建议。

2015年，中国新《预算法》完成“破冰之举”，制度性放开了地方政府的发债融资权。配合新预算法的颁布，中央政府敦促地方政府通过债务置换，实现财政隐性赤字的显性化管理，遏制地方财政隐性风险。当此背景下，国家自然科学基金青年项目“中国地方财政隐性赤字的规模估测、风险量化与动态监管研究”（71203106）自2012年立项以来，历经三年研究周期，完成了各项设计任务。现将主要内容和重要结果报告如下。.本课题整体上可分为三个相互分野又逻辑互联的分报告，即地方财政隐性赤字的“规模估测”、“风险量化”和“动态监管”研究。在分报告之前，总报告首先介绍了课题项目的制度背景、相关概念、研究方法和技术路线，进而从理论、经验和政策层面总结了国内外管控地方财政隐性赤字风险的相关研究。在“规模估测”子课题，本研究首先以审计署公告数据为基础估算了全国地方政府债务余额和财政隐性赤字的演化趋势，发现全国估测数据可以得到历史证据的支持；进而，本研究将收支核算、相关度印证、潜变量观测等隐性经济估测技术融合进“隐性杠杆率”、“平台债加权”两套方法，将全国总量数据细化到了分省层面。在“风险量化”子课题，本研究认为应构建地方财政隐性赤字风险的“早期预警”、“高危预警”两套预警机制。利用分省估算数据，我们用“先导指标法”进行了省级风险的早期量化预警，进而以“二元递归树”法检验了预警结果的稳健性。根据中国实际情况，本报告设计了针对市县级政府的高危预警模型框架，进行了风险控制的情景分析。在“动态监管”子课题，本研究设计了“事前设限、事中控管、事后重组”的“前瞻后顾”型动态风险监管策略，为央地财政关系改革提供政策思路。.除三项子课题外，另有几项研究贯穿于研究报告的始终。一是系统剖析中国地方财政隐性赤字膨胀的经济、政治、财政、金融等制度诱因，为风险管控提供理论依据；二是对中国省级政府的财政偿债能力进行量化评级，以数值试验方法测试各省区的偿债压力和举债融资的可持续性；三是对地方财政隐性赤字的经济影响进行经验分析，从政治经济学视角观察地方官员的隐性赤字扩张偏好。结合上述研究结论，本研究认为，在隐性赤字风险的制度缓释过程中，地方政府举债融资的大国治理模式应从“加力”向“增效”转变，改善地方财政隐性赤字的中长期影子收益。本报告将为“新常态”趋势下，宏观经济治理机制的框架改革以及央地财政关系的协调重塑提供方案和依据。