知识密集型服务外包中的知识共享激励与知识资产争端协调机制研究

A smooth development for knowledge-intensive service outsourcing is based on knowledge sharing. The feature of knowledge sharing for knowledge- intensive service outsourcing is knowledge's bidirection and circulation. As for how to improve bidirectional and circular knowledge sharing between clients and service providers, this project starts from the point of knowledge's explicitness, tacitness as well as complementation and substitutability between above two, developing respectively a formal contract incentive mechanism for explicit knowledge's bidirectional and circular sharing, a relational contract incentive mechanism for tacit knowledge's bidirectional and circular sharing, and a coordinational incentive mechanism for both explicit and tacit knowledge's simultaneous bidirectional and circular sharing. Knowledge's bidirectional and circular sharing between clients and service providers can be inspired with above three incentive mechanisms. Developing knowledge sharing intensify the knowledge assets dispute between clients and service providers. In order to manage knowledge assets dispute, this project develops an asset proprietary rights dispute coordination mechanism for explicit knowledge under complex patents and incomplete contract situation based on proprietary rights of explicit knowledge, and an asset control rights dispute coordination mechanism for tacit knowledge under inconsistency of limited rational prediction and knowledge diffusion risks based on control rights of tacit knowledge. In the end, this project offers feedback and improvement for above incentive and coordination mechanism and provide some ideas and methods in order to inspire knowledge's bidirectional and circular sharing between clients and service providers in knowledge-intensive service business and to manage knowledge assets dispute.

知识共享是知识密集型服务外包业务得以顺利开展的基础。知识的"双向、循环"共享是知识密集型服务外包中知识共享的特点。针对如何促进客户与服务商间知识"双向、循环"共享问题，本项目首先从知识的显性、隐性及二者间互补替代性出发，分别建立显性知识"双向、循环"共享的正式契约激励，隐性知识"双向、循环"共享的关系契约激励，及显性与隐性知识同时"双向、循环"共享的协同激励，去激励客户与服务商知识"双向、循环"共享。随后，针对知识共享加剧了客户与服务商间知识资产争端这一问题，从显性知识所有权和隐性知识控制权出发，分别建立了复杂专利环境下和不完全契约下的显性知识资产所有权争端协调机制，有限理性预测不一致下和知识扩散风险下的隐性知识资产控制权争端协调机制，去协调知识资产争端。最后，对上述激励及协调机制应用，反馈改进。为激励知识密集型服务中客户与服务商知识"双向、循环"共享，协调知识资产争端提供一些思路和方法。

知识共享是知识密集型服务外包战略成功实施的基础，但是其会加剧知识资产争端，同时，加剧的知识资产争端又会反过来抑制知识共享，因此在激励客户与服务商进行知识共享时，需要建立知识资产争端协调机制，以保证知识共享得以顺利进行。. 就如何促进客户与服务商之间知识“双向、循环”共享问题，本项目以研发外包这类典型的知识密集型服务外包业务为研究对象，重点分析了研发过程的知识共享和研发成果转化过程的知识共享激励问题。对于研发过程中的知识共享激励问题，首先针对正式契约无法有效激励服务商隐性知识共享的问题，构建非正式的关系契约，激励风险规避的服务商进行隐性知识共享；随后针对研发过程中服务商垫资能力影响知识共享的问题，设计了考虑服务商垫资能力的收益共享研发外包合同；最后针对服务商有限责任影响知识共享的问题，设计了服务商道德风险下，考虑服务商资金限制的支付契约和考虑服务商赔偿能力的惩罚契约，进而比较基于服务商有限责任的奖励与惩罚契约的激励有效性。对于研发成果转化中的知识共享激励问题，针对技术成果转化中的服务商道德风险与知识共享激励问题，在奖励激励的基础上进一步引入监督激励，分析了合作奖励机制与非合作监督机制（包括确定性和随机性监督）的成立条件，随后比较了合作奖励、确定性监督、随机监督三种机制对服务商道德风险的防范激励效果。. 就服务商与客户之间的知识资产争端协调问题，本项目选择供应链知识交易作为研究对象。由于供应链知识交易双方投入要素无法验证，往往引发双边道德风险，进而造成双方知识资产投入争端问题，因此，基于供应链合作创新视角，运用委托代理理论，设计了双边道德风险下，供应链企业间知识交易的正式契约及关系契约协调机制。针对供应链企业间显性与隐性知识交易引发争端的情形，设计了供应链企业间显性与隐性知识多任务冲突协调机制。. 上述研究不仅为解决知识密集型服务外包中知识共享与知识资产争端问题提供了理论依据，而且能够促进我国知识密集型服务业的发展。