基于功耗特征的硬件木马识别模型与算法研究

In recent years, the emergence of a new type of integrated circuit chip for hardware attack, known as hardware Trojans. The so-called hardware Trojan is malicious hardware design modifications to meet unconditionally or under certain triggering conditions to achieve the purpose of changing the system functionality or disrupt system functionality . Chip design and production in many processes (design, production, packaging,etc) are likely to be third-party hardware maliciously implanted Trojan , pose a serious threat to the security chip . Therefore, the study of Hardware Trojan detection technology for chip, especially about millitary, finance, health care and other areas is particularly important. Currently, Hardware Trojan defense technology research is still in its infancy, the research focused on the detection techniques based on power analysis. Unfortunately, there is no effective analytical techniques based bypass feature modeling methods and recognition algorithms can achieve accurate detection of Hardware Trojans Logic. The project is planned to research Hardware Trojan power characteristic information modeling and recognition algorithm to solve the the core technology problems of power analysis based hardware trojan detection.

硬件木马是近几年出现的一种针对集成电路芯片的新型攻击方式，它通过对硬件设计进行恶意的修改，以达到无条件或在一定触发条件下实现改变或破坏芯片功能的目的。在集成电路设计、生产、封装等分工细化的今天，芯片设计和生产在多个环节都可能被第三方恶意地植入硬件木马，给芯片安全带来严重威胁。因此，研究硬件木马的防护检测技术，对于芯片安全，尤其是国防、金融、医疗等领域的芯片安全尤为重要。基于旁路特征信息的木马检测方法是领域内研究热点，但目前的研究成果不能很好地处理工艺偏差和噪声的影响，无法实现对硬件木马逻辑的有效检出。本项目以密码芯片中实现的硬件木马电路为对象，利用现有功耗采集平台实时采集芯片的功耗特征信息，研究实测功耗数据的降噪抑噪方法，提出基于功耗特征的硬件木马识别模型与算法，解决基于功耗特征信息分析检测技术中的关键算法问题。

硬件木马是近几年出现的一种针对集成电路芯片的新型攻击方式，它通过对硬件设计进行恶意的修改，以达到无条件或在一定触发条件下实现改变或破坏芯片功能的目的。在集成电路设计、生产、封装等分工细化的今天，芯片设计和生产在多个环节都可能被第三方恶意地植入硬件木马，给芯片安全带来严重威胁。因此，研究硬件木马的防护检测技术，对于芯片安全，尤其是国防、金融、医疗等领域的芯片安全尤为重要。基于旁路特征信息的木马检测方法是领域内研究热点，但目前的研究成果不能很好地处理工艺偏差和噪声的影响，无法实现对硬件木马逻辑的有效检出。本项目以密码芯片中实现的硬件木马电路为对象，利用现有功耗采集平台实时采集芯片的功耗特征信息，研究实测功耗数据的降噪抑噪方法，提出基于功耗特征的硬件木马识别模型与算法，解决基于功耗特征信息分析检测技术中的关键算法问题。